The right of the people to initiate legislation is a right "of the first order." McKee v.
but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the general assembly. "The legislative power of the state shall be vested in the general assembly. Moreover, article II, section 1, of the Colorado Constitution provides that "ll political power is vested in and derived from the people." Article V, section 1, describes the power of the people to initiate laws as follows: The people of the State of Colorado "have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves." Colo. We therefore hold that this action is not moot. 57providing for declaratory judgmentswere supposed to make unnecessary. The only way ACORN could be assured of obtaining a decision on the merits of its proposed plan would be to proceed with it and raise its arguments in defense to a felony prosecution, a procedure that section 13-51-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973, and C.R.C.P. If ACORN were to be denied a decision in this case because of the passage of the date for placing an initiative on the ballot, there is no reason to believe that it will be any more likely to obtain review the next time. placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections, as long as Illinois maintains her present system as she has done since 1935." 394 U.S. The Court stated that "while the 1968 election is over, the burden. Ogilvie, supra, the Supreme Court found justiciable a challenge to Illinois' petition requirements for independent candidates for the offices of electors of President and Vice President of the United States, even though the claim was based upon an election that had already been held. *762 This case falls, as do so many election cases, within the exception to the mootness doctrine that allows review of matters "capable of repetition yet evading review." See, e.g., American Party v.
#ACORN INVESTMENT REVIEWS DENVER TRIAL#
The trial court held that ACORN's method of petition circulation was prohibited by the statute and that the statute was constitutional.Īs a threshold matter, we address the defendants-appellees' argument that the issue raised in this appeal is moot because the 1982 elections have been held. Prior to beginning its campaign, ACORN sought a judgment declaring its proposed method of petition soliciting not to be in violation of section 1-40-110, C.R.S.1973 (1980 Repl.Vol. Their remuneration was not dependent on the number of signatures, if any, obtained. These people were to be paid between thirty and forty percent of the contributions they collected, depending on the number of days worked per week.
Part of its planned campaign involved sending people into communities to obtain signatures for an initiative petition and at the same time request financial contributions for ACORN. Robin Urevich is the director of staff for ACORN in Colorado.ĪCORN wanted to institute a petition campaign to place an initiative on the 1982 ballot or to assist in gathering signatures for a petition proposed by another group. It is an organization of neighborhood groups whose purpose is to advance the interests of persons of low and moderate income. ACORN is a nonprofit Arkansas corporation registered to do business in Colorado. The trial court decided the case on cross-motions for summary judgment based upon a stipulation of facts. 1B), dealing with payment to initiative or referendum petition circulators, and held that a combined fund-raising and signature-gathering procedure proposed by ACORN was prohibited by the statute. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellees.Īppellants Robin Urevich and Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) seek reversal of a decision of the Denver District Court that upheld the validity of section 1-40-110, C.R.S. *761 Philip Burton Green, Denver, Steven Bachmann, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants. Robin UREVICH, and Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Plaintiffs-Appellants,ĭuane WOODARD, Attorney General for the State of Colorado and Natalie Meyer, Secretary of State for the State of Colorado, Defendants-Appellees.
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